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"FORA

HEALTHY
AMERIC~'
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Labor's Struggle for
National Health Insurance
1943--1949

D

URING THE 1940S ORGANIZED LABOR,
searching for a way to provide its membership
with basic health care, became the driving force
in a decade long battle for national health insurance. Labor worked with the executive and legislative branches of government in an attempt to pass legislation for a "Healthy America." The course of this
campaign had a profound effect on the shape and substance of health care up to the present time.

Physician treating chil.d of a family covered l7y the Farm Security Administration health plan, November 1939. In the fight
over a national health insurance bill both the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and its opponent the American
Medical Association (AMA) used the image of the sick chil.d to
sway public opinion.
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Senator James E. Murray (Democrat-Montana), September
1957.
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ArthurJ Altmeyer, commissioner for Social Security, on his final day at the job, April 10, 1953.

Labor did not always look to the government for social remedies. In the nineteenth century, health benefits
most often took the form of mutual aid and insurance
arrangements that union members paid for themselves.
Unions had a well-learned suspicion of government intervention in labor relations and relied on a tradition of
voluntarism that focused on direct bargaining with employers for its gains. In negotiating contracts, however,
labor organizations felt compelled to concentrate on
wages, hours, and the very legitimacy of unions as bargaining agents, rather than "fringe benefits" like health
care.
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the labor
movement worked with New Deal leaders in generating
legislation beneficial to organized labor and began to
30 SUMMER 1993

abandon .traditional voluntarism to work with the growing federal government. World War II accelerated this
process. When, in the 1940s, national health insurance
captured congressional attention, organized labor was
ready to participate.
The movement for public health insurance coalesced
around a group of professionals who worked for the new
Social Security Board. Arthur Altmeyer, the commissioner of social security, and Wilber Cohn, technical advisor to the commissioner, had trained at the University
of Wisconsin, home since about 1915 to the American
Association for Labor Legislation which advocated statesponsored programs for health insurance. Isadore Falk,
the director of research and statistics for the Social Security Board, held a Yale Ph.D. in public health and
also had strong ties to the Wisconsin group. All had been
influenced by the work of sociologist Michael Davis who
in 1928 created the Committee on the Cost of Medical
Care and became a leading voice in the drive for health
legislation. The Social Security Board also h ad ties to
organized labor with Marion Hedges, research director
of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
on its staff. Several labor leaders served on its advisory
board. 1
In 1938 Altmeyer, Cohn, and Falk helped arrange a
National Health Conference attempting to pave the way
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Congressman john D. Dingell (Democrat-Michigan), March
1944.

Senator RobertF. Wagner (Democrat-New York), n.d.

for Senator Robert Wagner of New York to sponsor a
national health insurance bill. Introduced in 1939,
Wagner's bill (S 1620) proposed giving grants to states
for the development of health insurance programs. Although the plan had the support of key administration
officials, President Franklin Roosevelt wavered and the
bill failed. The opening round of a decade long fight
had ended.
Although the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
and other labor organizations had representatives at the
National Health Conference, they had not played a
prominent role. This changed in July 1943 when Senator Wagner, SenatorJames Murray of Montana, and Representative John Dingell of Michigan introduced the
Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill (S 1161-HR 2861), a broadening of the Social Security Act to include a provision
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for national h ealth insurance for persons of all ages financed through a payroll tax. Senator Wagner's devotion to the cause of organized labor was already
legendary by the mid-l 940s, dating back to his service
on New York's Triangle Waist ~hirt Commission with
Samuel Gompers in 1911. Murray and Dingell had
equally strong ties to organized labor. Representative
Dingell was a life-long member of the International Typographical Union in Detroit, and Murray was a member of the United Mine Workers of America who had
witnessed the monumental labor violence in Butte in the
early twentieth century. Murray's interest in health reform was a direct outgrowth of his concern for miners'
suffering from silicosis.2
Marjorie Shearon, once an aide to Falk at the Social
Security Board, and later a health analyst for Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, claimed the 1943 bill
was written with so much input from organized labor that
the bill's working title was the "AFL Bill. "3 Falling victim
to the combined effects of the war and a preoccupied
president, the legislation died in 1944 at the end of the
Seventy-eighth Congress.
With opposition forces solidifying on all fronts against
labor during the 1940s, the AFL and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) began to work together
on national health insurance. In 1944 the AFL appointed
LABOR'S HERITAGE 31

Nelson Cruikshank, an ordained Methodist minister, as
director of social insurance activities, a particularly appropriate appointment because he had previously served
as the head of migratory labor camps in the Farm Security Administration and had organized a program of
1,200 participating doctors to care for migrants in 200
camps. 4
The CIO never gave as much priority to national
health legislation as the A.FL. Kathleen Ellickson, a member of the CIO's research department and formerly on
the staff of the Social Security Board oversaw health issues. Based as it was on industrial unionism, the CIO may
have held out the hope that the problem could more
easily be solved by direct contract negotiations with employers.5 Such hopes were less realistic for many AFL craft
based union members, such as construction workers, less
Nurse visiting Farm Security Administration (FSA) agricultural
workers ' camp, Bridgeton, NJ, June 1942. Prior to becoming
spokesman for the AFL on social security issues, Nelson
Cruikshank served as director of the FSA 's 200 migratory labor
camps where he introduced a program of govemmentfunded
health care.

tied to one employer. Limited resources, however, existed for both organizations, and Cruikshank, like
Ellickson, found himself working alone, without a staff.
Altmeyer of the Social Security Board later recalled that
Cruikshank and Ellickson had "to carry the ball and were
always moaning and groaning that they still couldn't get
their principals really steamed up. "6 Still, by 1944 organized labor had two full time professionals to press its
health reform interests.
In February 1944, Senator Wagner solidified plans for
new legislation starting with a conference held in his office. Present were AFL representatives, members of the
National Farmers Union, and a group of sympathetic
doctors called the Physicians Forum. Michael Davis was
also at the meeting, his work on health care having at32 SUMMER 1993
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Above: Kathl.een Ellickson of the CIO and Nelson Cruikshank
of the AFL,june 1953. Right: This eight-page pamph!.et, For a
Healthy America, origi,nally appeared as a policy statement
by AFL President William Green during his testimony before the
Senate subcommittee on Health and Education, September 18,
1944.

tracted the attention of the AFL and the CIO. Participants at the meeting decided to have Davis set up an
outside group to be known as the Committee for the
Nation's Health (CNH), funded largely by the labor
movement and wealthy New York philanthropists Albert
and Mary Lasker. 7
When Roosevelt was reelected in November 1944,
hopes ran high for new legislation with labor, liberal legLABOR'S HERITAGE 33
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islators, private organizations, and wealthy, concerned
public citizens forming an effective coalition. The
president's death in April 1945 propelled into office an
untested successor with an unknown agenda. Harry
Truman quickly proved, however, a forceful ally to the
national health insurance front. Cruik~hank, who played
a key advisory role in drafting the new legislation, recalled
later that "no one had to persuade Truman." The
president's commitment to health care reform had
grown out of his days as a judge in Missouri witnessing
first-hand the results of poverty and inadequate medical
care.8
On, November 19, 1945, Truman delivered to Congress a message proposing a program of national health
insurance. William Green telegraphed Truman lauding
his "vigorous and forward looking message." Green also
urged AFL state and local bodies to support the president.9 In early 1946, Green sent Truman a letter requesting minor changes in the bill. Truman quickly approved
the changes, then passed them on to Senator Murray to
be incorporated into the new Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill
(S 1606-HR 4 730) .10 To promote the bill, the AFL produced a pamphlet, entitled "For A Healthy America."11
In June and July 1945 labor representatives and James
Patton, president of the National Farmers Union, asked
the surgeon general to sponsor a series of workshops
relating to the health insurance bill. Cruikshank of the
AFL, officials from the CIO, and the Social Security
Board planned the workshops. The first was held in St.
Paul, Minnesota, February 6-9, 1946. Its sixty-five delegates included representatives from the AFL, CIO, and
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, as well as government officials. The conferences' not-so-hidden agenda
was to drum up support for the Murray-Wagner-Dingell
bill. Government officials distributed literature from the
Committee for the Nation's Health, and Harry Becker
of the U. S. Children's Bureau openly endorsed the

health bill. The first conference's results pleased the organizers, and they planned several other workshops. 12
As the health insurance bill headed to committee, all
signs looked favorable. But in the Senate, opposition,
strongly encouraged by the American Medical Association (AMA), solidified under the direction of Senator
Robert Taft. Son of a former president, Taft was an archconservative and isolationist, determined to protect his
ideal of small town independent yeomen and businessmen from the encroachments of big government and
big labor. Such a world view, arguably well out-of-step
with mid-twentieth century America, fitted conveniently
with the AMA's view of doctors as autonomous servants
of the community. Taft and the AMA quickly formed a
powerful bulwark against Truman's health proposals.
In April 1946, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Education, chaired by James Murray, opened hearings
on the new Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill. Within moments
of its introduction, partisan bickering engulfed the proposed legislation. When Senator Murray complained
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Left: Notab/,e Ohioans, Senator Rnbert A. Taft and American
Federation ofLabor President William Green, temporarily shelve
their political differences whi/,e receiving honorary degrees from
Kenyon Colkge, Gambier, Ohio, June 1949. Right: Dr. Morris
Fishbein, editor of theJournal of the American Medical Association and vigorous opponent ofnational health insurance
kgislation, June 1940.
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about editorials that referred to his bill as socialistic,
Senator Taft interrupted, charging that it was indeed
socialistic. Murray retaliated, calling Taft "impertinent
and insulting." Offended, Taft left the room, vowing not
to return. 13 The hearings continued on an only slightly
less acrimonious basis. Green and Cruikshank of the AFL
testified on behalf of the bill, but the former quickly
found himself being badgered about the overall costs of
the proposed program, a subject about which he was
hardly a specialist. 14 With the Taft boycott, the hearings
floundered. By July, Senator Murray recognized no
health legislation could pass in 1946. He looked forward
to the midterm elections with the hope of finding a more
hospitable atmosphere. 15
While labor had mounted an impressive lobbying campaign for the new health bill, those aligned against it
belittled the effort. Dr. Morris Fishbein, the imperious
editor of Journal of the American Medical Association, led
the attack. Considered the "sparkplug" and "political
boss" of the AMA, Fishbein vigorously attacked national
health insurance, having the AMA buy newspaper space
across the country to publish such items as a cartoon of
a "socialized" doctor arriving not at a patient's sickbed,
but at his funeral. 16 Fishbein used his position as editor
of the AMA journal to rally doctors against the reforms.
His editorial column endlessly attacked the bill, canonizing Taft for "the forthrightness with which he condemned the entire proceedings as a venture in
socialism. "17
The AMA offered an alternate "14 Point" plan for
improving medical care based on extensions of voluntary plans and locally based aid to the needy. 18 In May
1946, Robert Taft introduced a bill (S 2143) promising
grants to states to pay for health care for the very poor.
The CNH immediately assailed Taft's bill as inadequate
and humiliating for working men: "To require the half
of the population to take a pauper's oath in order to see
these doctors or be admitted to these hospitals is degrading and un-American. This is what the Taft plan means. "19
One non-controversial bill on health did, however, pass.
On August 13, Alabama Senator Lister Hill and Ohio
Senator Harold H . Burton's hospital construction grant
bill, introduced the previous year, became law.
The wave of post-war strikes in 1946 hampered Labor's
effectiveness as a lobbying agent. With workers every36 SUMMER 1993

where walking the picket lines, focusing on the complexities of health reform proved difficult for the unions. One
outcome of the strikes was an unprecedented health care
package negotiated by John L. Lewis of the United Mine
Workers of America. 20 This contract breakthrough
opened the door for other workers to demand similar
programs and created an atmosphere of competition
among industrial unions trying to keep up with each
other in improving health, pension, and welfare benefits. 21 In September 1946, the newly elected president
of the United Automobile Workers, Walter Reuther,
wrote Falk of the Social Security Board asking for his help
in preparing a study for the development of a group insurance program for auto workers. 22 On the other hand,
management viewed health benefits much differently.
Irving S. Olds, chairman of the board of U.S. Steel, insisted that welfare was not a suitable topic for negotiation and that only the hazardous nature of the mining
profession warranted special treatment. 23
The 1~46 congressional elections proved a c~lamity
for Democrats, with Republicans achieving a majority in
the Senate. Taft replaced Murray as chairman of the
newly renamed Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.
Taft used his new clout to ram through, over a presidential veto, the Taft-Hartley Act imposing new restrictions
on unions. New efforts to pass a revised health insurance
bill in the summer of 1947 went nowhere with Taft in
charge of the committee. In particular, the increasingly
tense cold war atmosphere of anti-communism hampered supporters of the bill. Opponents of national
health insurance labeled it "socialized medicine."
Shearon, Falk's former staffer, now working for Senator
Taft, spent endless hours linking proponents of the
Murray-Wagner-Dingell legislation to socialism or communism. Shearon also drew attention to the use of government funds to sponsor the "Health Workshops." Falk
warned his employees of Shearon's actions and urged
caution, but the workshops had already come to the attention of the House Committee on the Expenditures
of the Executive. 24 Subcommittee hearings to investigate
the workshops ran concurrently with the hearings on the
A strident cartoon on the supposed evils of "socialized" medicine, created lYy the National Physicians Committee, an AMAfunded institution, February 1946.

WHEN THE GOVERNMENT "SOCIALIZES" MEDICINE
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1947 health insurance bill (S 1320). House subcommittee members did not call any labor officials to testify at
the hearings on the workshops, but witnesses mentioned
the participation of Cruikshank and others. Ultimately
a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report cleared
the organizers of any wrongdoing, but the political damage caused the cancellation of a series of workshops
planned for the South. 25
In this adverse political climate, supporters of national
health insurance took a more conciliatory approach.
CNH began a campaign to appeal to groups "on the
fence" of the issue. Committee director Davis privately
recommended that the administration try introducing
several scaled-down pieces of legislation including farm
health bills and public aid to voluntary health insurance. 26
Having hit a lull in 1947, Truman recognized that a
fresh approach was necessary. To breathe new life into
his health proposals, he appointed Oscar Ewing, a charismatic and respected New York lawyer and member of
the Democratic National Committee to the position of
Federal Security Administrator. Although politically experienced and hoping to use health reform as a possible
launching pad for a 1952 run for the presidency, Ewing
was shocked by the level of partisan acrimony over the
health issue. An interview in the New York Times quoted
him as referring to himself as "an innocent in politics
compared to these medical politicians-they can slit a
throat with great ease. "27 Ewing announced that he was
undecided about national health insurance. Eager to establish a broad base of support for health reform, he
called for a high profile National Health Assembly to
meet in May 1948 to discuss the issue. To organize his
Health Assembly, Ewing appointed to an executive committee some who favored national health insurance:
President Green of the AFL, President Murray of the
CIO, and President Patton of the National Farmers
Union. Also serving on the committee were others hostile to nationalizing the health system, such as a representative from Metropolitan Life Insurance, and the
presidents of the American Chamber of Commerce and
American Medical Association. This committee met and
set an agenda for the assembly designed to "stake out
areas of agreement. "28
In May 1948, the assembly opened with several hundred participants representing a spectrum from Fishbein
38 SUMMER 1993

Above: Oscar Ewing, Federal Security Agency Administrator
(194 7-195 2). Although a strong advocate of national health
insurance, he was a longtime friend of Harvard Law School
classmate Senator Robert Taft, principal opponent of health l.egislation. ~ght: Older workers often suffered from medi<;al prob1.ems. Chronic anemia forced the retirement of this former steelworker, who is receiving a periodic transfusion of whole blood,
May 1949.

of the AMA to Davis of the CNH. Remarkably, in spite
of the diverse viewpoints, the participants found common ground. The AFL, CIO, and National Farmers
Union began by putting forth several principles to guide
health care reform. To the utter surprise of everyone,
the AMA delegates endorsed several of the key principles,
including the notion that "contributory health insurance
should be the basic method of financing health care for
the majority of the American people." Although the AMA
delegation also accepted the general principle that "tax
resources" might contribute to health care where insurance fell short, the organization did not endorse any
form of government-operated health insurance program.
The only instance of disharmony in the conference came
when Fishbein rose to declare that the "workers of
America do not want peasant medicine." This warranted
an immediate and sharp response from Cruikshank, insisting that Fishbein had "no right to speak for American workers. "29
Ewing's Health Assembly was the first attempt to actively interest business in national health insurance.
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Harold Swift, chairman of the board of Swift Meat Packing, Gerald Swope, chairman of the board of General
Electric, and Paul Hoffman, president of Studebaker, all
attended the conference. While business leaders generally opposed a national plan, they were clearly interested
in improving the state of the nation's health care system.
Although the conference never endorsed national
health insurance, organized labor and the Truman administration did not abandon their attachment to the
issue. Before the conference, in early 1948, AFL President Green had Cruikshank meet with Ewing about the
possibility of preparing a new health care bill for 1949.
Although Ewing was officially neutral on the issue, Green
told Senator Wagner, "I am glad to report that Mr.
Ewing's response was a favorable one."30
Cruikshank outlined recommendations for a new bill
that "would not try to do too much too quickly." He suggested a more concisely written bill and the exclusion of
persons earning over five thousand dollars a year. He
also proposed that the administration assign a ''White
House spokesman" to shore up support for the bill, particularly among southern Democrats.31 Approving
Cruikshank's proposals, Wagner confidently wrote Green
that the "period of incubation is about over. Now we need
action." 32
The White House assigned Oscar Ewing to the task.
Casting aside the middle ground prescribed by his Health
Assembly, which assiduously avoided any endorsement
of national health insurance, Ewing released in September 1948 a 185-page study supporting national health
insurance entitled "The Nation's Health: A Ten Year
Program." At the beginning of his report, Ewing thanked
each member of the Health Assembly's executive committee, including the AMA representatives, who in no
way had endorsed its contents. In his report, Ewing outlined the seriousness of the nation's health needs, recommended extensive state and local cooperation on
medical matters, and proposed a comprehensive national
health insurance plan. Ewing called for guaranteed medical care, including dental and mental health care, for
all Americans to be funded by a 3% tax on annual earnings with some contributions from the federal
government's general revenue. 33 Dr. Fishbein immediately attacked Ewing's report as "a shrewdly contrived
40 SUMMER 1993

document full of innumerable misrepresentations. "34
Ewing released his recommendations on September
2, 1948, just as the presidential campaign was heating
up. Truman quickly endorsed the proposals, making
them a rallying cry for the incumbent president in the
face of congressional inaction. Truman's vigorous support for national health insurance also helped, along with
his veto of the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act, to shore up
the often wavering support of organized labor for his
reelection. His upset victory promised a bright future for
health insurance. With the active support of Truman and
Ewing and the return of the Democrats to control of the
Senate and the House, potential for a national health
insurance program reached its highest point.
The American Medical Association was not prepared
to take the shift in fortunes lightly. It assessed each of its
members $25 to fund a campaign by the California-based
public relations firm of Baxter and Whitaker. The AMA
gave the firm a budget of $1,600,000 for 1949. Among
otht;r activities, Baxter and Whitaker mailed letters to
Protestant clergy across the nation, asserting: "To the
Christian who believes in the sanctity of life nothing
could be more dangerous than the spectacle of politicians arbitrarily juggling the birth rate through the application of propaganda. "35 To AMA members it sent
posters and pamphlets of the Sir Luke Fildes painting
The Doctor, with captions reading: 'Would you change this
picture? Compulsory health insurance is political medicine," and "Voluntary Health Insurance-The American
Way will keep politics out of this picture. "36 The advertising firm moved quickly to link health care legislation
with communism, falsely crediting V. I. Lenin with saying, "socialized medicine is the keystone of the socialist
state. "37
In January 1949, Cruikshank and Ewing had a debate
on radio with Dr. Fishbein of the AMA. Planting a question in the audience for Fishbein, Cruikshank and Ewing
got the AMA editor to describe in detail his "hard working" trip to England to study that country's health system. Cruikshank then countered by reading Fishbein's
account of the trip published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in which the doctor described the
visit as a leisurely vacation, dominated by eating and golf.
The live audience erupted with laughter against Fishbein.
As a direct result of the incident, later that year, the AMA
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Nelson Cruikshank (left), American Federation of Labor specialist on health issues, and Oscar Ewing (right) , Federal Security Agency Administrator, ca. 1949. Symbolizing the close coofJeration between organized labor and the Truman administration, Cruikshank and Ewing toured the country promoting
national health insurance.

journal removed Fishbein as editor. 38
Another blow to the AMA came with a Justice Department investigation of the association for monopolistic
practices. The Committee on the Nation's Health as well
as other groups had long argued the AMA was monopolizing doctors, and by the late 1940s, the Truman administration was eager to follow up these charges against its
political enemy. As part of a thorough inquiry, the FBI

raided the AMA' s Chicago headquarters in search of files
dating back to the 1930s. 39
By the time that Senate and House hearings opened
in May 1949 on a new Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill (S
1679-HR 4312), the harmony found at the National
Health Assembly the previous year had evaporated. Senator Taft again promoted an alternative bill to provide
funds for the care of the indigent. A group of moderate
Republicans, led by Senator Irving Ives of New York and
Ralph Flanders ofVermont introduced the Flanders-Ives
bill (S. 1970-HR 4918), a health package which included hospital construction and government support
for private insurance plans. The Flanders-Ives bill attracted the support of Republicans, such as Richard
Nixon, who were eager to report back to constituents
LABOR'S HERITAGE 41

that they had supported at least some measure of health
care reform. 40 Dr. Winslow Carlton, who had developed
hospital prepayment plans in New York City and who was
a close associate of Davis, helped draft the Flanders-Ives
bill. Carlton believed the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill,
promoting a full scale reorganization of the health care
system, was too comprehensive to pass. 41
The hearings on the various health bills proceeded
on a crowded and confused docket. Missouri Senator
Forest C. Donnell, a Republican-described by Dr.
Carlton as seeing communists under every bed-took the
lead in attacking the proposed national health insurance. 42 During Cruikshank's testimony, Donnell demanded to know what part Cruikshank had played in
drafting the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill. While the AFL
staffer denied sitting "with those who actually drafted it,"
he did admit to providing an outline of AFL concerns
to Truman congressional Democrats. Donnell also challenged Cruikshank's insistence that the AFL had "no
desire to socialize medicine." The Missouri senator emphasized the degree of governmental control the bill
would introduce into medical practice and concluded,
that "this is another step toward socialism. "43 In another
exchange at the hearings, CIO Secretary-Treasurer James
Carey told the story of a CIO member who had become
ill and subsequently insolvent because his health plan
paid for only one month of hospitalization. Senator Taft
insisted that the story was uncommon, claiming no more
than one in fifty persons would suffer such a calamity.44
In spite of Ewing's efforts to interest business leaders
in supporting the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill, Robert
Hornby of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce Committee
on Social Security testified against the bill, citing his own
company's employee health plan. 45 While business leaders had shown some interest in increasing social security payments to ease pressure for employee pension
plans, they expressed no similar interest in a national
health plan.
By the summer of 1949, the combined efforts of the
AMA, the American Dental Association, the American
Pharmaceutical Association, the private insurance corporations, and dozens of other groups allied against the
national health insurance program managed to stall in
committee the 1949 version of national health insurance.
No action was ever taken on S 1676 or HR 4312 in ei42 SUMMER 1993

ther chamber of Congress. In July, Senator Taft triumphantly wrote to opponents of national health insurance,
"the administration has dropped any idea of passing the
Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill. "46
According to Nelson Cruikshank, two developments
in 1949 doomed the health insurance program. First, all
precedents holding back large industrial unions from
negotiating for fringe benefits such as health insurance
were suddenly wiped away. In the midst of the push for
health legislation, the National Labor Relations Board
ruled that group health and accident insurance was a
legitimate issue for collective bargaining. On May 24,
1949, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the ruling. The
Supreme Court quickly sustained the decision when it
declined to review the case. 47 Henceforth, welfare items
would be every bit as appropriate a bargaining topic as
wage and hour issues.
The second development, cited by Cruikshank, involved contract negotiations themselves. The United
Steel Workers of America (USWA) requested bot)l wage
increases and a pension and health plan in its 1949 negotiations with steel companies. Talks quickly stalled. In
the summer of 1949, President Truman appointed a
presidential Steel Industry Board to mediate the matter.
After studying the issue and determining that fringe benefits would not have the inflationary impact of a wage
increase, the board granted a 10¢ an hour social security package that included an employer-sponsored health
plan. Following quickly on the heels of the USWA contract, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) in late
1949 negotiated hospital, sickness, and accident insurance benefits for its members.
While some advocates continued to push for national
health insurance, many key participants recognized that
labor's new welfare contracts doomed the latest MurrayWagner-Dingell bill. Falk, the head of research at Social
Security, saw the union contracts as having an "almost
hypnotic effect" on workers, blinding them to the need
for more comprehensive programs. 49 Organized labor,
however, did not entirely abandon a national health bill.
According to Ellickson, the CIO, unlike the AFL, believed
A CIO poster supporting national health insurance, ca. 1949.
It conveys the powerful image of health care for a family with
young chi/,dren.

AS IT WILL BE
if we get
Congress
to enact

NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE:
::·'"··!Y.·.>.:.:.: ....·.·.···~-:J~~· . · ······ · ·~~:
JOE DROPS IN TO SEE THE DOCTOR
SEE, DOC, l'M INSURED
AGAIN THIS YEAR. AND
WHILE l'M HERE., HOW
ABOUT LOOKING ME OVER?
I WANT TO SEND MARY
IN NEXT WEEK FOR AN
EXAMINATION , TOO

AND THE DOCTOR COMES TO JOE'S.
SHE FELT WORSE THIS MOR.NING.
DOCTOR, SO I THOUGHT l'D BETTER
CALL YOU.

/

LATER MRS. WORKER TAKES LITTLE

JOHNNY TO BE EXAMINED.

IS I T SERIOUS ?

DR BROWN'S SECRETARY SENDS A

HOW LUCKY WE ARE THAT THE
DOCTOR AND HOSPITAL BILLS ARE
BEING PAID BY THE INSURANCE FUND.
THE CONTRIBUTIONS YOU HAVE MADE
FROM YOUR PAY CERTAINLY HAVE

BEEN WORTHWHILE

that health and welfare bargaining encouraged government legislation because it educated workers as to the
benefits of health insurance and the need for further
expansion to the millions still without medical coverage. 50
Generally negotiating with larger industrial companies,
the CIO was in a better position than the AFL to establish health benefits for its members through collective
bargaining. More than the AFL, the CIO essentially put
its eggs in two baskets on the health care front, pressing
for coverage through collective bargaining while also
calling for national health insurance. While Ellickson
might not have seen the contradictions in the CIO's efforts, others did. Cruikshank, for instance, saw the collective bargaining breakthroughs as taking the heat off
of his efforts for a nationalized system of health care.
Harry Becker, head of the social security department for
the CIO-affiliated UAW and formerly a Children's Bureau staffer who helped organize the health insurance
workshops, became the leading CIO figure promoting
national health insurance in the 1950s, but his efforts
went nowhere.
The demise of the 1949 health care legislation forced
supporters of national health insurance to redirect their
efforts. In the summer of 1950, Falk wrote a memo suggesting a shift in approach, asking, "what about the plan
we have frequently discussed in the past-health benefits for those who are OASI [Old Age Survivors Insurance] beneficiaries?"51 A bill (S 3001-HR 7484) to
establish a health plan restricted to the elderly was introduced in 1952 by Senator Murray and Congressman
Dingell among others. A version of this bill was finally
passed as the Medicare plan in the mid-l 960s. As was
the case with the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bills, organized
labor, in particular Cruikshank and Ellickson, now working together at the AFL-CIO, cooperated during the
1960s with members of Congress and with the sympathetic Lyndon Johnson administration to develop and
pass the Medicare plan.
The efforts of government and unions in promoting
national health insurance after World War II failed because of business opposition and the remarkably effective resistance of Senator Taft and the AMA. Yet the drive
for national health insurance did bring the issue of
health to the nation's attention, allowing the rise of an
alternative system in which business and labor arranged
44 SUMMER 1993

I T'S MY HEART,

voe,

NOT MY
POCKETBOOK

During the decade of the 1950s organized labor continued to
regard federally mandated health insurance as important. This
1953 cartoon appeared with the statement: ''We in the CIO must
continue the struggle for better health on many fronts. Under
present political conditions, the greatest hope for progress lies
through collective bargaining, but our accomplishments through
that channel do not lessen the need for government action. "

for health coverage through collective bargaining. Ironically, this boom in private insurance helped bury the
national insurance program. The story of labor's first
drive for national health insurance reflects the difficult
choices faced by organized labor, forever operating in
an antagonistic atmosphere. In spite of powerful political ties reaching directly into the White House, conservative opposition forced organized labor to rely on its
tradition of voluntarism and self-reliance through economic power as the most immediate and perhaps only
avenue to provide its membership with basic health se•
curity.
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